主讲人：Prof. Tom Stoneham

 

　　主持人：江怡教授

 

　　时 间：2018年3月23日（周五）9:00—11:00

 

　　地 点：北京师范大学哲学学院  主楼A802

 

　　Introduction:

 

　　Tom Stoneham is professor at the department of philosophy, and Dean of Graduate Research School, Vice Chancellor’s Office, University of York. His research areas of specialization include: 17th/18th Century British Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind: Self-Knowledge, Perception, Consciousness, Dreaming, and Metaphysics of Modality and Time. His main publications are:（1）Berkeley’s World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues. 2002；（2）Causation and Modern Philosophy. (ed.) 2011；（3）Locke and Leibniz on Substance. (ed.) 2015.

　　

　　Abstract:

 

　　In 'The Refutation of Idealism' (1903) GE Moore famously argues that a certain claim is both the basis for believing that 'esse is percipi' and self-contradictory. The claim in question is the identification of the sensation of blueness with the object of the sensation, namely blueness - or perhaps an instance of blueness - itself. Call this claim 'Objectualism' about the sensation. The connection between Objectualism and the esse is percipi thesis was noted by Berkeley 200 years ealrier, though he did not think Objectualism was self-contradictory. In this paper I first defuse Moore’s charge of self-contradiction before defending Objectualism on two grounds: first, that if we accept the argument that naïve realism best explains the phenomenology of perception, especially what is called transparency, then Objectualism provides a better explanation than other relationist forms of naïve realism; and secondly, Objectualism avoids the most problematic forms of the hard problem of consciousness (something Berkeley also noted at the start of the second of the Three Dialogues – see Stoneham 2013). Neither Berkeley nor Moore suggest that Objectualism alone entails that esse is percipi, but it does provide a fertile starting point for idealism.

　　

　　主办单位：外国哲学与文化研究所，分析哲学国际研究中心